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© Bowdoin College 
 
 
Jeffrey W. “Jeff” Peterson GMOH# 077 
(Interviewer: Brien Williams) February 7, 2009 
 
 
Brien Williams:  This is an oral history interview with Jeff Peterson for the George J. 
Mitchell Oral History Project at Bowdoin College in Maine.  We’re in Jeff’s home in Falls 
Church, Virginia, and today is Saturday, February 7, 2009, and I am Brien Williams.  Jeff, would 
you start by giving me your full name, its spelling, date and place of birth, and your parents’ 
names? 
 
Jeff Peterson:     Sure, Jeff, Jeffrey Ward Peterson, J-E-F-F-R-E-Y, Ward, W-A-R-D, Peterson, 
P-E-T-E-R-S-O-N.  My father’s Dr. Merrill D. Peterson, my mother Jean H. Peterson. 
 
BW:  And the date and place of your birth. 
 
JP:  March 23, 1954, in Lexington, Massachusetts. 
 
BW:  Good.  Would you give me a little bit of your background, where you grew up and your 
education and so forth? 
 
JP:  Sure, I grew up in Lexington, Massachusetts.  At the age of about ten my family moved 
to Charlottesville, Virginia.  My father was teaching at the time at Brandeis University, he’d just 
finished a book on Thomas Jefferson, and he was offered a job as a professor, the Thomas 
Jefferson Professorship of History, at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. 
 
We moved to Charlottesville in 1963-64, and that was a time of some civil unrest in Virginia, 
and other places around the country, related to schools, racial issues.  It was an interesting 
transition for our family, but ultimately Charlottesville turned out to be a great place to be.  I 
finished high school there, went to Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine.  After a couple of 
years working in Maine got married, went to, moved out to Seattle, Washington, to go to the 
University of Washington Graduate School of Public Affairs.  I got a master’s degree there, and I 
started working part-time in Seattle for the Environmental Protection Agency regional office in 
Seattle, worked while I was in graduate school to make some money, but also I really enjoyed 
working with EPA and found that there was a lot of cross connection between the graduate work 
and studies I was doing, and the work I was doing at EPA, so it really was a good combined 
experience. 
 
And after a brief time, that was the early eighties, there was a, EPA was not hiring right at that 
point, as I graduated from University of Washington, and I worked for a time for Seattle City 
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Light, the publicly owned electric power utility serving Seattle, but did have an opportunity to 
get a job about a year later with EPA back in the Washington headquarters office and my wife 
and I decided that, as much as we liked Seattle, we wanted to be back on the east coast so did 
that and worked for EPA for several years.  And about that time I had the opportunity to work on 
the Hill, starting in Senator Mitchell’s office, and then for the Environment Committee for 
another eight years about. And since then, I left the committee in ‘94, actually ninety-, early ‘95, 
and I’ve been with the Environmental Protection Agency since then. 
 
BW:  Okay, very nice.  Good summary.  What was your thinking in choosing Bowdoin? 
 
JP:  Well, I had looked at quite a number of different liberal arts colleges, I knew I wanted to 
be in New England, I, kind of growing up in Lexington to the age of ten, I had sort of imprinted 
with a New England outlook and always had a little bit of a transition coming to Virginia.  And 
my thought was to get back to New England for college if I could.  Turned out that I really loved 
Bowdoin when I got there and looked around, had a great interview with the dean of admissions 
there, who had I think a lot to do with my getting accepted and ultimately having the chance to 
go there, and really had a great experience there. 
 
BW:  And then what motivated you to move to the opposite coast? 
 
JP:  Well, I’d been working, after I graduated from Bowdoin, for the, a regional planning 
agency in Bath, Maine, and really enjoyed working with local governments.  It was the kind of 
job where you could meet with local selectmen, planning commissions, three or four evenings a 
week easily, working on things like comprehensive planning or environmental issues or zoning 
or transportation or coastal protection, at a very local level with really tangible projects.  And at 
the same time, I was interested in some of the bigger environmental issues and knew that 
probably to get into some of those other areas I would be, it would be good to have some 
advanced degree work.   
 
I was very interested in public administration issues, partly because that was a lot of what I was 
doing in the regional planning job, and I actually had a friend from Bowdoin who was a year 
ahead of me who was in the Graduate School of Public Affairs at Washington, gave it great 
reviews, was very positive about it, and that’s how I sort of learned about it.  I ended up applying 
there, got accepted, and that’s how I made that sort of transition. 
 
It was a kind of a different place, but it was a good thing to do at a comparatively young age, to 
sort of see a whole different part of the country.  My wife and I had just gotten married, and so 
we didn’t have a lot of, we weren’t carrying a lot of baggage.  We, her brother actually drove her 
VW car square-back out for us, and biggest single thing we had was a Laser sailboat, which was 
strapped on the top of the car.  And that made it out there, but we didn’t have much else beyond 
that, and so it was easy to move out and go from there. 
 
BW:  When did you, quote/unquote, ‘get your calling?’  What, was it while you were at 
Bowdoin, or maybe even earlier on, where you sort of knew the direction you wanted your 
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professional life to go in? 
 
JP:  Well, I think I had a pretty clear idea for a long time that I was interested in public 
service generally, certainly at high school.  I was pretty involved in local politics in high school.  
I kind of hate to admit it, and I certainly never advertised it when I was working for Senator 
Mitchell, but I was pretty well sold on George McGovern as a presidential candidate back in the 
day, and somehow had, somehow had missed the Muskie, the brilliance of Senator Muskie, 
which I learned to appreciate later.   
 
But one of the things that Senator McGovern had been supporting was a local, or state 
conventions that had diverse representation, and part of the representation idea was that there 
should be younger people involved in conventions.  Virginia had a state convention at the time, 
and I was elected from my precinct to be the representative, one of the delegates from the city of 
Charlottesville to the Virginia state convention, as a senior in high school, and I think I was 
technically the youngest delegate at the Virginia state convention.  And it was a great experience, 
and really kind of locked me into a strong interest in both government, but also politics and also 
Democratic politics.  I later learned that probably things would have worked out better if I’d 
been a Muskie delegate, but - 
 
BW:  Why? 
 
JP:  Well, working with folks who had, in Senator Mitchell’s office who were, many of 
whom had worked for Senator Muskie, when they heard that I’d been a, had anything to do with 
George McGovern, I took some serious shots over that and I was educated as to my obvious 
failings at a young age, and that I should have had the insight to recognize that Senator Muskie 
was the way to go.  And I guess I’m mostly convinced that they were right. 
 
But it was a great education and an opportunity to really kind of see government wheels turning 
in a very kind of tangible way.  And for, it was many years later actually at, I can’t remember the 
exact year but one year in the Maine State Democratic Convention, and I think it was the year 
Senator Mitchell was running for reelection, I’d have to look that up, but a number of staff, I 
think a half a dozen of us from Washington went up to Portland for the convention in Portland.  I 
thought at the time, I hadn’t been to a state Democratic convention since that first one I’d been to 
for McGovern, and the obvious links between McGovern and Muskie were, I remembered all 
that all over again, but. 
 
BW:  So can you recall your first awareness of George Mitchell when-? 
 
JP:  Well probably, I was working at EPA and had a job working for the Office of Water, 
which was in charge of the drinking water and clean water programs.  They had a lot of interest 
in the Clean Water Act; I was interested in the Clean Water Act legislation.  There were lots of 
people working on that topic, and while I was able to do some work on it, it was clear that I 
wasn’t probably going to be able to be substantively involved.  But I learned enough to know 
who the members of Congress were who were involved in that, Senator Mitchell was the ranking 
  
Page 4 of  28 
member on the subcommittee of the Environment Committee, with jurisdiction for the Clean 
Water Act.   
 
I had the Maine background from college and having worked in Maine, and actually at the time, 
the several years we’d been back in Washington, my wife’s family was in Wiscasset, still is in 
Wiscasset mostly, so we’d been back up to Maine quite a lot, so a Maine connection seemed like 
an obvious thing, and so I was interested in learning a little more about Senator Mitchell because 
of the Maine connection and the Clean Water Act connection.  And that was really what 
prompted me to enquire of his office whether having someone from EPA working for him on a 
detail would be of interest to them, and it turned out it was and that’s how it worked out that I 
went over there for a detail at the beginning of 1985. 
 
BW:  How frequently did that happen?  Did EPA have lots of people on assignment to 
members of Congress? 
 
JP:  It was comparatively rare.  There are established programs for government employees to 
get experience on the Hill, some of them are run by different organizations around town.  And 
EPA at that time would occasionally identify someone who would be selected to fill a position 
on a competitive basis, to be available for a detail.   
 
I kind of short circuited that process a little bit by, I sort of knew that you didn’t have to follow 
that route; it was also possible just to be on a detail regardless of sort of the more traditional 
route.  And I think I had a, I had a maybe a general kind of intuitive feeling that if there was a 
good fit between a person at EPA and a member of Congress that usually something could be 
worked out.   
 
Interestingly enough, the guy I worked for at the time at EPA was the assistant administrator for 
Water, he was Jack [E.] Ravan by name, had been on the Hill for many years as administrative 
assistant to Strom Thurmond, and was a very conservative, had a very conservative outlook.  At 
the same time he was a great believer in the importance of understanding what went on in 
Congress, and that federal agencies often didn’t really have a clue what was going on on the Hill, 
and he believed that it was important for more people from federal agencies to have experience 
in Congress.  And it occurred to me that maybe he would have a problem with my working for 
Senator Mitchell, a Democrat from Maine, but he said at the time, “It’s the experience that’s 
important, it doesn’t matter whether you’re working for a Democrat or a Republican, you’ll get 
great experience either way.  And if he’s someone who wants you to work on issues that you 
would be working on at EPA, then that’s fine, sounds great for me, I think you should do it.”  
That was his basic take on it, which was a little bit of a surprise to me but I think, looking back 
on the experience, I absolutely understand what he had in his mind, and that I have the same kind 
of outlook, I think, if I got presented with a similar situation today. 
 
BW:  Who was the chairman of the subcommittee? 
 
JP:  John Chafee from Rhode Island, and he had a, he had a very strong staff, I think he had 
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more time in Congress than Senator Mitchell.  I think there always was a very strong and warm 
personal relationship between Mitchell and Chafee.  Chafee was really a wonderful person, as 
well as a wonderful politician, and a great environmentalist, but he was a very easy person to like 
and to get along with.  And I think he also, he was also always very supportive of Senator 
Mitchell, I think he appreciated both Senator Mitchell as a person, but the New England 
connection and the interest in the environment.  And I don’t know enough about the earlier years, 
but I think Chafee and Muskie must have had some kind of relationship.  I never really asked 
about that, I never saw it because of course Muskie wasn’t in the Senate by the time I got there.  
And of course Mitchell had worked for Muskie and must, I think had probably known Senator 
Chafee in some form early on, so. 
 
BW:  Did Chafee have an EPA person on his staff? 
 
JP:  No, not from EPA. 
 
BW:  And that wouldn’t have been a contentious matter that Mitchell had expertise from a 
government agency, and the chairman didn’t have? 
 
JP:  Well no, I don’t, I never perceived that, and I think of course they were in the majority 
so they had more staff than we had.  In fact, part of the reason I think the Mitchell office decided 
to bring me on, or offer to bring me on, was that the committee had a difficult full agenda that 
year, they were also going to be working on Superfund legislation. The person in the personal 
office, the staff person, Charlene Sturbitts, who was covering a lot of what the committee was 
doing, a lot of the environmental stuff, I think really wanted to focus on the Superfund 
reauthorization.  And at the same time I think trying to do that and Clean Water together would 
have been a really difficult job.  So I think she looked at having me being able to cover the Clean 
Water stuff would have given her a cleaner time to invest in really getting the Superfund work 
done.   
 
And that was part of the logic of bringing me on.  Had they not been able to do that, I think 
Charlene would have been trying to cover meetings, sort of constant meetings, and trying to stay 
up and brief the Senator on both things. And the I think the majority, being better staffed, 
realized that there are some advantages to having the minority also be well staffed, because then 
they’re not feeling like things are running out ahead of them or out of control, or they haven’t 
been briefed, or no one’s explained this to them so they don’t really understand the issue.  The 
majority needs the minority to be a strong cooperative partner, and for that to happen it’s 
important to have good staff on both sides.  So I think they were happy to know that Mitchell 
would be staffed on the issues.   
 
And as it turned out the working relationships at the staff level were really good.  On the 
committee staff, of course, was Phil [Philip T.] Cummings, who probably more than anybody, 
majority or minority, was the expert on the Clean Water Act, and Phil did play an important role 
in staffing Senator Mitchell, I wasn’t doing it all alone, and he was representing the full 
committee but also supporting the ranking member of the subcommittee, and of course I was 
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new, I was, sort of, ‘Never done this work before,’ so I learned the ropes pretty quickly but I 
would have been really in over my head without some help right up front.   
 
And Phil had been, before the Senate had become, come into Republican control, he had been 
majority on the staff and had worked for Senator Jennings Randolph for many years and had 
tremendous expertise and knowledge, and also had, I think, a lot of trust among the Republican 
members and the staff.  So he was a tremendous mentor to me, someone who really helped me 
both with the substantive issues of the Clean Water Act, which I knew to some extent, but also in 
Senate procedure and what do you need to do to get the guy you’re working for to be ready to go 
to this hearing or able to deal with this meeting or what have you.  Between Charlene in the 
personal office and Phil in the committee office, they were a tremendous help to me. 
 
BW:  And you remained on EPA payroll. 
 
JP:  For the original plan.  Of course most details are for a one year period.  Come the end of 
one year, it’s often possible to extend it for another year.  We were right in the middle of a 
reauthorization process at the time, and the agency went ahead and did that, at Senator Mitchell’s 
request.   
 
BW:  So you were a good deal. 
 
JP:  Well I, we were doing a lot of work, it was great.  And I would have been very sad, to 
say the least, to have had to spend only the first year and to miss out on the second year because 
it was really just starting to get interesting.  And also, for someone who’s just sort of come into 
that kind of job, I, after the first year you’ve kind of done, you’ve been around the track once, 
and while I hadn’t sort of done things like working with the House on the conference bill and all 
that, I was starting to get my feet on the ground and feel like I kind of had an idea what to do and 
when, how, and made some of the obvious sort of first mistakes and felt like I was moving on, 
and so I was delighted to be able to spend the next year.   
 
And then of course, as it worked out, this was at the same time that Senator Mitchell was 
engaged in the leader’s race, and as a result of the leader’s race and the reelection of majority of 
members, it was possible for the Senate to change control to Democratic control, and what it 
meant on the Senate Environment Committee was that the staff ratios of people working for the 
Democrats increased, whereas people working for the Republicans decreased.  And because 
several staff positions opened up on the Democratic side, now the majority side, they were able 
to offer me a position working for the committee.  And while I worked for the committee, and 
the chairman of the committee, I was mostly focused on working for Senator Mitchell. 
 
BW:  Can you sort of tell the story of that Clean Water bill of ‘87 and sort of the autobi-, or the 
biography of the major piece of legislation? 
 
JP:  Yeah, I can give you the general outlines and then maybe if there are areas you want to 
go into a little more.  It should have been the Clean Water Act of 1986, and it would have been if 
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it hadn’t been for the, President Reagan’s veto, so it became the act of early ‘87 when it was, the 
same basic bill was passed again in the new Congress. 
 
And so the process began, well I should say the process had begun by the time I got there in 
early ‘85, at the beginning of that Congress.  And there was some work underway, but it hadn’t 
progressed very far, I think a few hearings had been held, but the Environment Committee was 
going to really put a more intensive effort into this.  Partly it was driven by a concern for, by the 
president and the White House, for the cost of the Clean Water grant program.  At that time it 
was running several billion dollars a year in grants to local communities for sewage treatment 
plants.  I think President Reagan was very interested in getting the federal government out of the 
sewage treatment business, and saw that as a program that could be ramped down to save money.  
This was sort of in the era of David Stockman and the whole OMB trying to wrest control of out-
of-control government spending.   
 
And one of the big issues was:  well, would there be just a termination of this important grant 
program?  Local communities felt it was absolutely essential to meeting the goals of the Clean 
Water Act and they absolutely had to have federal support to make these new sewage treatment 
plants financially affordable.  And Senator Chafee was in the kind of difficult position of, I think, 
feeling like there was a real need for financial aid to communities to do these projects, but also 
wanting to find a way to respond to the president’s requirement and interest in finding a way to 
disconnect in a few years from this program. 
 
So one of the things that – this was a major topic of conversation and debate and policy 
development.  It turned out that there was a proposal for shifting the grant program into a loan 
program, so that money would be provided to states for a number of years, about five years, they 
would take that money and make loans to communities at very low interest rates, and that those 
loans would be paid back to the state funds, not to the federal government, and that over the 
years, as each round of new appropriations went out as a loan, the communities would be paying 
back more and more of these outstanding loans and then the money they paid back would 
revolve out again as another set of loans.  And that if you gave enough capital to start these state 
specific loan efforts, that they would become kind of a permanent source of revolving financing 
to help the communities.   
 
And Senator Chafee felt like that was a key idea that could bring the president along, rather than 
perpetually providing these grants.  We would capitalize these loan funds at a diminishing 
amount of appropriations for about five years, there’d be a total capital investment, and then the 
federal government would stop making any payments to these funds and they would be self 
supporting.  And so that was kind of presented as the compromise, and that with that a lot of 
other things related to other policy aspects of the act could also be developed and packaged 
together, but the real key new idea and the politically important idea was that there would be this 
new approach to financing sewage treatment projects and that they would be, there would be an 
end to the ongoing, indefinite federal investment. 
 
BW:  Were there prototypes for this kind of an arrangement in other government programs, or 
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was this kind of a unique or new idea? 
 
JP:  It wasn’t completely new, but I think we felt it was a very new application in the, to the 
environmental financing area.  And a lot of the initial work related to developing the first bill that 
was the subject of the first round of the hearings in the subcommittee was focused on that topic.  
But there were other topics, key ideas in that sort of early stage involved developing a new 
program for control of non-point sources of pollution, diffuse pollution, runoff, and the 
development of storm water controls for urban storm water discharges particularly but also from 
industrial and construction sites.  And so all of those were being debated. 
 
There was also a strong concern for toxic pollution and the development of a toxics provision.  
All of these were ideas that were being generated as a result of the hearings.  Senator Mitchell 
was the, as the ranking member of the subcommittee, was working closely with Senator Chafee 
on designing the first range of hearings, the scope of them, the witness lists, dealing with the 
administration and their testimony, and using those hearings as a basis for putting together a bill.  
And principal folks working on that for Senator Chafee, Bob Hurley, Steve Shimberg.   
 
There were a number of other substantive elements of the package.  It was a pretty 
comprehensive, grew to be a pretty comprehensive revision of the act, involving updating 
enforcement authorities, some new, entirely new programs related, for instance the National 
Estuaries Program was created as a part of this process, which is now many years, in effect it’s 
now protecting twenty-eight individual estuaries around the country with comprehensive 
planning and EPA support and participation.   
 
So there were lots of different issues out there in the organization of the first versions of the bill.  
Of course subcommittee markup and then full committee, I don’t re-, I don’t have the dates 
exactly in mind but, exactly when floor action occurred on that package, I think it was in the fall.  
And we had a, I think a pretty constructive relationship with the House staff, of the House 
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which had developed a pretty comparable bill.  I 
mean there were some differences, but we were able over the next year to make a lot of progress 
with that.  I think we had a pretty good working relationship on the Senate side among the staff 
and the members, and a lot of interest on the House side.   
 
There were some areas of controversy, particularly with respect to things like protection of 
wetlands, where I think on the Senate side we felt like the House proposals were, would be a 
weakening of the current protections.  So there were issues to resolve, but on the whole I think 
there was a pretty strong interest in seeing good progress.  And ultimately the conference report 
was passed, the president vetoed it, and early in 1987 we took the bill back to the floor, passed it 
again, and sent it to the president, so. 
 
BW:  The override. 
 
JP:  Yes. 
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BW: Right. 
 
JP:  With an override vote.  And I forget the override vote. 
 
BW:  Oh, it was huge. 
 
JP:  But it was virtually, virtually unanimous. 
 
BW:  Yeah, eighty-six to fourteen in the Senate - 
 
JP:  Oh, thanks, you’ve got that there. 
 
BW:  Four-oh-one to twenty-six in the House.   
 
JP:  I thought, I forgot that there were fourteen against it, I thought it might have, my 
memory is that it was a little less than that. 
 
BW:  So which of these various, what was the final outcome in the bill in terms of the grant 
program and some of these other issues that were being so much a part of the hearings? 
 
JP:  Yeah, well the centerpiece, the new approach to financing sewage treatment, was pretty 
well worked out as a, I would really say a, on a three-part, between the House, the Senate and the 
administration, I think worked pretty cooperatively to work out the details of what would, what 
the eligibilities would be, how the mechanics would all work, the states were pretty involved in 
trying to learn sort of the mechanics of this and what they would have to do to make this all 
work.  So it was a very constructive process, and that really was kind of the most, the easiest 
thing to express in press releases and, it was the kind of thing that came to dominate the macro-
level discussion.   
 
But there were so many things, so many other important amendments to the act which you had to 
get down three or four paragraphs into a press release before you could start talking about them.  
And even then they, it was hard to get them to clearly articulate it in press lingo, explaining the 
new program for controlling non-point pollution, or why the stronger enforcement provisions 
were so good, or any number of those.  
 
Probably one of the most underappreciated provisions of the bill was the storm water, the 
expansion of the permitting program to address storm water, which had been a very controversial 
issue as to whether storm water constituted a discharge that ought properly to be regulated under 
the discharge permit program with enforceable requirements, or whether it, those discharges 
were really more like runoff and diffuse runoff, which belonged in the, outside of the permit 
program, outside of the enforceable authorities.  And so it was a very important accomplishment 
to provide essentially for a staged process for EPA to expand the permit program, first starting 
with large municipalities and then focusing a few years later on smaller municipalities.  And 
looking back on it, I think really, although the, it’s probably safe to say that the storm water 
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program, even today, isn’t quite what was originally envisioned at that time to need to be, it has 
been a tremendous step forward that was really facilitated by that statute.   
 
And interestingly enough, the idea that the revolving loan fund appropriations from the federal 
government would ramp down and terminate, which had been so central to the political 
consensus on the bill, has never materialized in fact.  We still provide-   Even this year’s 
appropriation and probably next year’s appropriation will continue to provide over a billion 
dollars at least, if not more, for capitalizing these same sewage treatment funds.  And not only 
that, the idea from the Clean Water Act was borrowed some years later and a new fund for 
funding drinking water facilities was created in the Safe Drinking Water Act, using essentially 
the basic, the same model as was built in the original ‘87 amendment. 
 
BW:  So the fact that it’s still revolving, it’s not a show, sign of failure of the program, or not?  
I mean the original intent was for it ramp down the - 
 
JP:  Right, well that would depend on your perspective.  I think the local communities and 
the states feel like, “Well the more money we can put out there, the better the environment will 
be and the better the communities will be.”  And so I think it’s, if you had the impression of the 
OMB from the Reagan years, they would say that, “Well Congress reneged on the deal that they 
were going to actually terminate this and live with so much capitalization and no more.”   
 
At the same time, I think it’s also fair to say that the program has evolved a little bit differently 
than was advertised at the time.  Part of what was used to make the pitch to shift into this new 
financing mode was that the value to communities of a very low interest loan was in fact in some 
ways comparable to the grant that they would get under the old program, which was limited to 
fifty-five percent federal funding, and the community had to work with the state or use their own 
resources to pay the forty-five percent.  And they were going to pay market rates of interest on 
their share, even if they got the free grant money for only a little more than half.   
 
So the market rates that they would pay, strung out when you ran the numbers out over the 
twenty- or thirty-year life of their bond financing, actually started really to add up.  If you could 
save all that interest by offering them a loan at one or two percent for the entire amount, then all 
the interest saving, you could work out in equivalency of value, and it varied depending on what 
your assumption about the prevailing market rate for bond financing was, and if the, at the time 
we were doing the bill, the cost of money, the interest rates, were comparatively high.  I can’t 
remember exactly, but seven or eight percent, and when you were that high, those interest 
payments on the local share really got out of hand.  So if you could get away from all of that and 
have a very, if you assumed a two percent loan for the total amount, it was actually equivalent to 
like a forty or fifty percent grant.  
 
So that was the argument that I think we used with some success, that we weren’t offering the 
local community a dramatically different funding package.  Unfortunately, I think, a couple of 
things have happened.  Not only have we continued to provide the capitalization, but for many 
years subsequent to that, during the nineties particularly, the interest rates dropped, the prevailing 
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interest rates on the market dropped, which meant that the sort of perceived deal of a loan, even 
at the low interest rate, wasn’t quite as good as it had been.   
 
And we didn’t anticipate that the state financing authorities that were created to run these loan 
programs would be as interested as they had proven to be in optimizing the returns to their own 
state fund.  So we were dealing with the League of Cities, and the counties and the local 
governments who were trying to manage the financing of these projects, and they wanted to get 
as a low an interest rate as possible.  The state agencies that we created, once they had capital to 
hold, they would start loaning the money out, but they weren’t loaning it out at one or two 
percent, they would say, “Well prevailing rate is seven, or six, I’ll give it to you for five, and 
you’re going to get a deal there, and you’d rather have it from me for five than to pay six, right?”  
And they would say reluctantly, “Yes, but those people in Congress said we were going to get it 
for two, where’s the two?”  “Well, we’re not really doing that because we think it’s in the state’s 
interest to get as much money from you local governments as we can.”   
 
So I think we were all disappointed over the years to see that many of the states, not all of them, 
but many of them, could have offered lower interest rates and saved communities money, but 
chose to offer only the rate they had to offer to make the money go out the door.  So in that 
sense, having the appropriations kind of continue on, it’s just one of a number of things that 
evolved as the program, and they all kind of balanced out a little bit. 
 
BW:  Overall, you and Senator Mitchell were happy with the outcome of this process. 
 
JP:  Yes, I think on the whole the bill was a really strong bill.  And obviously since then it 
hasn’t been possible to put that combination of factors together again.  I think Senator Mitchell 
felt that it was a good bill nationally for the country, and it was a good bill for Maine.  We 
worked very hard to have a Maine connection to the bill and to make sure people from Maine 
had opportunity to testify, both in the formal hearings, but also to talk to Senator Mitchell about 
issues they had.  And I think he was very happy with it as a whole, looking at the really big 
picture and with a little bit of hindsight, and knowing how things played out as he was majority 
leader and the pressure that he was putting against the Bush administration at the time about 
things. 
 
I, it’s safe to say, and if I had been maybe a more experienced staff person at the time, if I’d 
really kind of known more about the bigger political picture, I might have looked at it differently, 
but I don’t think there was necessarily an assumption that he as the ranking member of the 
subcommittee needed to endorse the decision to step away from the grant program and move to 
this loan program.  This was in effect intended to phase out an important federal grant program 
related to environmental protection.  It wasn’t certain that it would work.   
 
As the Democratic kind of champion of the Clean Water Act, as the ranking member of the 
subcommittee with jurisdiction in the Senate, if Senator Mitchell had taken the position, “We 
really don’t want to go there, we don’t think this will work, it’s not proven, we don’t want to see 
a termination of these funds,” I think it would have been very hard to construct the rest of the 
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deal, all the other good things that happened.  And yet that would have been a, a not particularly 
surprising position for a Democrat, particularly a strong environmental and a liberal Democrat, 
to take at the time.   
 
And I don’t know, it’s hard to imagine if I’d had a few years of experience before that issue 
really kind of came into focus, “Are we going to get behind this new thing and try and use it to 
get a larger bill ultimately enacted, or are we going to let this Reagan-inspired dead end for the 
sewage treatment program, are we going to oppose that?”  I didn’t really at the time have sort of 
enough of a big picture as to how all those parts were moving.  In the end, I think it was the right 
decision to support the new program, and it’s continued to work pretty well.  I think Senator 
Mitchell had a lot of res-, personal respect for Senator Chafee, also had a lot of respect for his 
judgment about whether this would work or not.  If someone other than Senator Chafee had been 
the chairman of the subcommittee, it might have, Senator Mitchell might have seen it differently, 
might have been less willing to let this topic be discussed and played out.   
 
It wasn’t like he agreed to it unconditionally on the first day of the Congress, I mean there were 
hearings and there were lots of opportunities to talk about it, but I think at any point he could 
have stepped back from that as being the centerpiece and said, “Well, the traditional Democratic 
constituencies, those state and local governments, they want to keep the grant program and I’m 
going to stick with them, and this new innovation inspired by the Reagan White House or what 
have you…”  It wasn’t really, but it was conceived as a compromise that would get around the 
White House’s determination to kill the program. 
 
In fact, at that time the White House might have succeeded in dramatically reducing 
appropriations.  It would have been a big battle but, so I think while I don’t recall ever having a 
meeting where anything like that starkly was presented, I think it was very much on Senator 
Mitchell’s mind that this was a key point of agreement between him and Chafee, and that if he 
were to back out of it, it probably would have meant that the bill would have not had the kind of 
ability to bring parties together that ultimately was able to get it passed. 
 
BW:  You mentioned that at the same time a bill was working its way through the House.  
How did that, first of all, from a totally naïve standpoint it seems silly that two bills on the same 
topic are being worked on independent of one another.  But was there a lot of collaboration so 
the language before it ever got to conference was fairly comparable, or how does that work? 
 
JP:  Well, you’re right, it would make sense.  But it often doesn’t happen, and it didn’t really 
happen in this case.  While I was staffing Senator Mitchell and the folks working for Chafee and 
sort of the full committee staff person, Phil Cummings, there were four of us sort of all working 
together at the staff level, Phil and I on the Democratic side and Bob and Steve on the 
Republican side, and Jimmy Powell working for Senator Durenberger also on the Republican 
side, and Ron Outen, I shouldn’t forget Ron Outen, working for Senator Stafford, we were 
working very sort of, much as a unit on the Senate side.   
 
We were obviously aware of the bills that were being introduced in the House, and, but I was not 
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in regular contact with counterparts on the House side, we weren’t comparing notes, we weren’t 
asking sort of big picture questions:  “Do we really want to get into this revolving loan fund and 
lose the grant program?  Do we really -?  How do we want to deal with storm water?  How do we 
- ?”  There was nothing of that kind.  The House did their thing, we did our thing, as best we 
could, with the notion that, “If all the stars align and both bills pass respective houses, we’ll meet 
you all in conference and we’ll hash it out.”   
 
And I think in a perverse, not perverse but a sort of an odd way, that’s actually really productive, 
because it allows for the different interests and views that kind of naturally come to the House 
side as opposed to the Senate side, to get expressed.  If somebody had some sort of cross House-
Senate control, I think some of the spontaneity and the innovation that naturally arose in the two 
different processes might have gotten tamped down a little bit.  While I think there were 
certainly parallels and commonalities in what we were doing, we had different language; we had 
different words on almost everything.   
 
That’s because different individual people had put the words on a piece of paper, and sometimes 
we thought mostly our words were better, and they thought their words were better, but that was 
part of the process in the conference, of figuring out that, “Well in this case we actually like your 
language, it turns out, on reflection, it’s better, or stronger, or whatever, than ours.”  Or, you 
know, “We actually like our language but we can live with your language, and because this is a 
give and take process, we’re happy to go with your language on this.”  And I think as a result of 
that, probably on balance, the bill was both stronger as it ultimately got enacted, and it also had 
more likelihood of broad member support, particularly in the context of overriding the veto.   
 
Because if a bill is perceived as being something that was really created in one, in the House or 
the Senate, and then just kind of adopted by the other, there isn’t that sense of ownership, there 
isn’t that sense of, “Well yeah, that’s,” you know, “I got that thing in that bill and I really want to 
see it pass.”  So that it’s almost like you need to keep the processes kind of separate, let them, let 
people build their own confidence in what they’ve done, and their desire to see the way they’ve 
got it, and then use the conference process to fight out and hash out what’s really going to be in 
the final bill.  And the art of that is that you get both a strong final product but also something 
that is recognizable enough to both House and Senate that they’re still interested in fighting to 
pass it, much less passing it over a veto.   
 
BW:  Now, I think I’m right in this case; the Democrats were in the majority in the House. 
 
JP:  Yes. 
 
BW:  So that would be another - 
 
JP:  That was a further, not, I wouldn’t really call it an issue because we worked very closely 
with those folks, regardless of, at the staff level, regardless of sort of who they happened to be. 
 
BW:  So when the House bill came to conference, it also contained the loan program in 
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replacing the grant program? 
 
JP:  Yeah. 
 
BW:  How long did the conference process go?  I mean not in exact days, but just sort of 
generally? 
 
JP:  Yeah, my recollection is that it was a pretty intense period for several months.  Three or 
four months actually. 
 
BW:  And who made the decision who was going to be party to the conference? 
 
JP:  Well, there’s of course two tiers, there’s the member tier and the staff tier.  The staff tier 
is pretty well working out among the staff, the member tier is, obviously starts with the chairmen 
of the full committees, and the chairman of the subcommittee, and their rankings.  And then, then 
the appointment as a conferee is, could get complicated depending on the bill.  It’s more 
complicated on the House side because they have more members, but in the case of the 
committee we were drawing people from the subcommittee as well as a couple of full committee 
members. 
 
BW:  And was most of the work done by staff, or was it evenly divided, or how did that work? 
 
JP:  Well, it’s a little hard to, I wouldn’t say most.  The vast bulk of the work was done by 
staff, but the really hard part was done by the members.  And there is a natural process where 
people who are pretty informed about the substance, know pretty well where their bosses are on 
the substance, can hash out ninety percent of it.  And frankly, to have a member sitting in a 
conference room for hours, days, weeks on end, going through this wording, that wording, is just 
not practical.  And so I don’t think this process was really much different from any other 
comparable sort of thing, that the vast majority of the bill was assembled, cobbled together from 
the two different, lots of drafts were exchanged – this was before the email word-processing 
phenomenon, so I’m sure it’s very different now.  Took a little longer back then to actually 
assemble the draft, share it, comment back, more meetings.  That rolled along for a long time.   
 
But that process really, the members are posted as to what’s happening and how that’s all going, 
and they have the opportunity to say, “No, I really don’t like that thing.”  But that whole process 
is really intended to distill down what are the hard nut issues where we just frankly just can’t 
agree.  And a good example, well this is probably less an issue in the conference than it was 
actually in the Senate floor debates, but the allocation formula is always a subject of a lot of 
member-level interest, because it’s the one place in the bill where a state financial amount is 
identified.  And when you, it wasn’t actually a dollar amount, it was a raw percentage, so if there 
were going to be two-and-a-half or 2.4 billion dollars appropriated for the Clean Water state 
revolving fund starting in 1987, there was a formula in the bill that said, “Maine will get X 
percent of that, New York will get X percent of that, and Rhode Island will get X percent of 
that.”  And everybody knew, and the press and the public knew, what that dollar amount was. 
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So members would naturally, that was something where they could fight for, “More money for 
my state.”  And there was of course the notion that, “Well, it should be based on the need.  
What’s the need?”  So we had countless, long, convoluted meetings with, talking with EPA 
about, “Well, what do we know about how big a need there is in Michigan versus what’s the 
need in Louisiana?  And how do you judge that fairly, and how do you come up with a good 
number that is the true need, and will give each state the amount they most adequately and 
appropriately need?”  But then you get the whole question of, “Well is that also a politically 
acceptable solution?” and then how do you kind of behind the scenes, it’s where the staff makes 
its monies, how to find a way for the politically acceptable solution and the needs-based solution 
to somehow harmonize into one set of numbers.  And sometimes it requires a little twisting and 
bending, and maybe even cracking of arms and legs to make it all work. 
 
But there was – I think this got reported at the time – that there was a longstanding disagreement 
between Senator Moynihan and Senator Bentsen on the committee as to whether the relative 
shares of their amounts were fair and appropriate.  And this went back and forth and back and 
forth for quite a while, and of course both of them were very well, major figures in the Senate at 
the time, and neither one of them wanted any perception that somehow they’d been gotten the 
better of, or somehow they didn’t get the best deal for their state.  And finally everything had 
been worked out almost to the last final dot, but we were still hung up over whether New York 
was getting enough, or whether Texas was getting enough, and at the time Senator Bentsen was 
the full committee chair so he really felt like he should be, you know.   
 
And finally Senator Moynihan turned to him and said, “Well, what’ll it take to make this deal?”  
And he just, Moynihan basically just scraped off the top of his allocation, what he thought he 
needed to get Senator Bentsen to agree that that was the right account, and that did it.  So that 
was not something the staff could have ever done, it was a personal gesture on Moynihan’s part, 
after months and months of fussing between them over this.  And there were lots of other cases 
where stuff like that - 
 
End of Disk One 
Disk Two 
 
JP:  - you know, worked out, or didn’t. 
 
BW:  So during conference you were pretty much full time on this. 
 
JP:  Oh, this was full time straight out pretty much from the day I got there.  An occasional 
Maine related issue came up that I was able to work on, and then a little bit of dips and things, 
but especially for the second year, it was definitely a straight out. 
 
BW:  Mentioning Bentsen and Moynihan, two real heavyweights in the Senate of course, were 
there others that were particularly critical parts of the Water Act, and where did Mitchell fit into 
the picture? 
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JP:  I think that the ‘87 amendments were important in the sense that that legislation was 
really, I think, one of the last products of a committee that was really focused on cooperating to 
get good, strong environmental legislation.  And in the years that have passed, I think the 
committee hasn’t been able to do that as well, anywhere near as well, as it had in the years 
leading up to, and probably going back really to the early seventies, the period between the early 
seventies and that Clean Water Act amendment – possible exception of the Clean Air Act 
amendments that came in the early nineties, where I think there was kind of an effort to rebuild 
that to some extent.  But in a lot of ways, the committee has polarized since the ‘87 amendments, 
and a little bit since the Air Act, and the, it’s been much harder for the committee to get the kind 
of cooperative bipartisan ability to work on legislation.   
 
So I think that it would be important to understand that in that context, Senator Mitchell was 
working very closely with Senator Chafee, Senator Chafee was working very closely with 
Senator Stafford, Senator Mitchell was talking, maybe not quite as closely but still closely, with 
Senator Bentsen, and there were strong, in a Republican controlled Senate, there were strong 
environmental Republicans, particularly Senator Stafford and Senator Durenberger, who wanted 
very much to see the bill passed.  So Senator Moynihan was also involved, but his strongest 
interest in the committee had always been more on the infrastructure, less on the environmental 
policy side.  He was involved in a lot of environmental policy, but I think his principle interest 
was in other parts of the committee’s jurisdiction.   
 
But really that network of Mitchell, Chafee, Stafford, and Durenberger and Bentsen, and Senator 
Lautenberg as an important member, very strongly supportive of the infrastructure work, worked 
very effectively as a team in the committee process in the Senate floor debate process. 
 
BW:  Stafford was chair; who was ranking, on the full committee? 
 
JP:  Bentsen. 
 
BW:  So let me just pause here for just a second.  What was it like moving from Mitchell’s 
staff then to the committee, how did that transition feel to you? 
 
JP:  Well, it was actually very easy for me.  I didn’t feel like it was a big transition at all.  
Maybe just a little bit about the two years that I was on the staff.  I think I was very fortunate in 
that, unlike some other people who immediately went to work for a committee, to have come to 
the Senate first in working for a, directly for a member on the personal staff.  There’s really 
nothing like kind of being directly in the group of people who are personally supporting the 
Senator, as opposed to working on just Environment with members who come and go, or even if 
your member, even if you know something about the interests of the member you’re working for 
on the committee, if you haven’t worked for their, in their personal office, you sort of miss an 
important dimension of what’s going on, what’s important to the member.  And so being able to 
work directly with the legislative staff in Mitchell’s office was a great experience. 
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And also, because I knew something about Maine and because I was interested in Maine issues, 
there was the network of people in Maine who were supporting Senator Mitchell in different 
Maine, or Senate offices, Mitchell’s offices around the state, and so if there were an interest, an 
environmental issue in Portland or in Bangor or Lewiston, there would be somebody to call.  
And I knew enough about what was going on back there to be interested in what they were 
doing, and I think they were interested in knowing somebody in D.C. actually knew something 
about Maine and was interested in them.  So that was part of the dimension of working there was 
the connection back to Maine.   
 
But also part of the connection was just being part of the legislative group of people who were 
supporting the Senator.  And at this point, we were mostly it.  Senator Mitchell hadn’t sort of 
moved through the process that he would follow into the majority leader job, and ultimately, 
toward the end of the time I was working for him, there were lots and lots of people who directly 
or indirectly were working for him as majority leader – in the policy committees, in the 
committees that he was, that he actually served on, the Senate floor staff, the personal staff, the 
Maine staff.  It would be interesting to see, and maybe there really aren’t very many people other 
than the Senator himself who could reconstruct the wall chart of the, starting with George 
Mitchell at the top.  You know, there were, there grew to be many, many tiers, and many, many 
people, who, in one connection or another, were working for him.   
 
But in 1985, that wasn’t the case yet, and it was the home state staff, when he was going back 
most every weekend, and they, we used to, we would hand him off, he was our responsibility 
until he left on Thursday night or Friday or whenever he left, and he got on the plane and he was 
gone, and we could all relax.  And somebody, Larry Benoit in Portland would pick him up, and 
they had a schedule and they did events and there were meetings but, and we would send him up 
with his briefing papers on stuff, if it was a meeting, and occasionally I did some meetings with 
him up there.   
 
Maine was an important dimension of it, but the personal staff during the week was a great 
experience in working with that whole team.  Partly because we all had a lot in common, we 
were all interested in Maine, I think we all had sort of somehow figured out that George Mitchell 
was a great person to work for, maybe by coincidence or maybe by plan, we’d sort of managed 
to sort of get there.  And while there were always people who were trying to get their issue or 
their topic to be the most important thing, we worked really well.  I always thought it was a 
really good, cooperative working relationship. 
 
And when I moved to the committee, my official employment status changed and technically I 
was reporting to the chairman of the committee, but it was understood that I was working for 
Senator Mitchell, but posted to the committee.  So while I didn’t sit in the Russell Senate Office 
Building any more, I moved over to the Hart Building and I got paid by the committee, not by 
Senator Mitchell – of course I’d never actually been paid by Senator Mitchell, I’d been paid by 
EPA – it never seemed like a dramatic transition, because I was still regularly going back to the 
Russell office, either to have lunch with people or to talk to people about what was going on.  
And when I had been in the personal office, a lot of the time, particularly the last year that I had, 
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although all my stuff was there, I had spent a lot of time in meetings over in the committee in the 
Dirksen Building, in the meeting rooms there, so it didn’t seem like a big jarring adjustment. 
 
BW:  Just one footnote here, when you met in conference with the House members, where did 
those meetings take place? 
 
JP:  Well they rotated; sometimes we found a room actually in the Capitol, sort of neutral 
ground.  Sometimes they were on the House side, the T and I [Transportation and Infrastructure] 
Committee conference room, sometimes they were in our conference room. 
 
BW:  Right.  How did – you talk about this community of folks in Mitchell’s office – did you 
have staff meetings with the Senator, or were most of your relationships with him unilateral or 
small group, or how did that work? 
 
JP:  I think everybody found a way that they could communicate effectively with him.  I 
mean people that stayed, anyway, did.  In my case, I think I felt most comfortable giving him a, 
as good a clear written statement of an issue as possible, and I’m more comfortable usually 
writing than I am talking, I’d have been happy to write all this out for you, but.  And I think I 
was really lucky in that Senator Mitchell happened to be someone who had higher tolerance than 
a lot of other senators would have, and that I later worked for proved to have, for the written 
word.  And probably I got better over the years at learning how to write to him effectively and 
how to communicate stuff.  I’m sure I was able to shorten stuff.   
 
But unlike, I think, some offices, which, for instance, might have had a, “Well, that memo was 
too long, next time the senator wants it on one page.”  While I never got that back from Mitchell, 
“This memo was too long,” you know, “make it shorter.”  I would on rare occasion send him 
long memos, and I always got them back, they always had, you can see them in the files, they’re 
all up at Bowdoin I think, most of them, and they all had the pencil checkmark on the top, which 
meant that it was ready to go out.  And for a while I was never sure; did that mean he really read 
it or did it mean that it sat in his inbox long enough and he didn’t want to read it at all?  And 
while I’m not certain of this, I’m pretty sure now that, based on hearing from him later about 
something he could have only gotten out of that memo, that usually when it was, had that little 
pencil checkmark that was sort of so obviously his, that he had read it.   
 
And I think over time I got to realize, and the thing that I think he did ask for, is regardless of 
how long is the memo, be really clear about what you want him to do.  Sometimes it’s obvious:  
here is your opening statement for the hearing.  And he was, frankly I don’t know if it was just 
me, but I think he was, with most of the staff he was very comfortable with the written word that 
we would give him.  And I was always amazed on many occasions, that he would deliver very 
effectively the material almost verbatim.  Other times he would ad lib it and improve it 
dramatically.  But my style of communication with him was predominantly written.  There were 
lots of opportunities for in person face-to-face, but they weren’t so much formal.  
 
Maybe somebody remembers them at a different period, but I don’t remember staff meetings 
  
Page 19 of  28 
with Senator Mitchell.  We would have staff meetings with Rich Arenberg or with whoever was 
AA at the time, but actually comparatively few of those.  They don’t really, I don’t really think 
many of those.  But we would staff the Senator for an event, we would see him briefly before in 
the committee room.  Mostly it was, “The hearing’s going on, or about to start, we need the 
Senator.”  You know, before cell phones, this was before cell phones, we’d get on the phone and 
we’d call Regina, Regina was sort of sitting right outside his office – I don’t know if you’ve 
talked to Regina but she would be a good interview if you could find her to do it, but – “Where is 
he?”  “He left five minutes ago.  And so he’s going to come around the back door and go through 
the conference room to come out onto the dais.”  And so we’d catch him and, we’d catch him 
coming off the elevator or coming through the door, first question, “Do you have your 
statement?”  “Got my statement.”  “Do you have any questions?”  “No, I’m good.”  And he’d 
kind of, that was it, walk up on the dais, he was fine, he’d ask lots of good questions, some of 
which we or I would have written, but others which he would have dreamed up himself and that 
went fine.  And so there was that kind of thing. 
 
And there was a lot of that in event-sort of format, but he was well enough prepared that not only 
did he have the statement, either he had read it ahead of time, because he always got it ahead of 
time, or by, at some point he kind of had internalized enough of individual staff people and he 
said, “Well, this is Jeff’s statement, I’m pretty confident that whatever Jeff’s got here, I can just 
read.”  And I think at some point he probably got to the point where he would just take it and 
first off, never having laid eyes on it before, he would start, “Good morning, welcome to this 
hearing,” and just boop right through it.   
 
But there were other memos on substantive policy questions where it was, ‘Do you want to 
sponsor this bill?  Do you want to introduce this bill?  Do you want to do a particular event 
related to one of the policy issues?’  And so framing the discussion in, a little bit of information, 
what he would need to know about Maine, why he would want to do it, were there any other 
political consequences or substantive consequences, and then getting right to the, you know.  
And I got to the point where I would frame a question in bold at the bottom of the memo, with a 
‘yes/no/discuss,’ and I almost never got back, and he would always check ‘yes,’ ‘no,’ or 
‘discuss’ in the pencil check, usually I got a yes, occasionally I got a no, almost never got 
‘discuss.’  And if it was ‘discuss,’ it was usually something I didn’t know about Maine, or 
something I didn’t know about a political thing with another member that he wanted to be careful 
about.  
 
But it was, I think, unique in that you could give that kind of written material to a senator, and 
for me, just being who I was, I would have been much more reticent and much more maybe 
inarticulate or what have you if the member, if the senator had a personal style of relying on just, 
‘Just talk to me, talk to me, talk to me,’ that wouldn’t have been a good fit for me.  And having 
had a chance to lay stuff out, do a good-   Someone who’s a federal judge has obviously got to 
have an ability to read through briefs.  I think he treated a lot of the memos as he would have 
briefs, with a lawyer’s kind of outlook and a judge’s interest in, kind of ability to do that.  And so 
he was a, that was a great fit for me, and I never really missed a lot of the interpersonal stuff.   
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I think over time, over the ten years I got so that I was sort of more comfortable.  We’d done 
enough things, hearings in Maine, different meetings or events, where I think I got more 
comfortable with his personal style.  Never to the point where, particularly chatty about anything 
other than the task at hand, I mean it was always very task-oriented, and he had so much to do, 
even at that early point, starting in ‘85, that I didn’t ever feel like I was going to impose on his 
time for anything other than absolutely what I needed.  But I think he appreciated it, I think he, 
there weren’t probably people who were not doing that, but maybe, I was always very careful of 
his time and I would get what I needed from him and I wouldn’t look for any more time that 
what I absolutely needed. 
 
BW:  Was he ever in situations where he was socially interacting with his staff, I mean did you 
have staff parties, Christmas parties or anything like that, or was it pretty much “tend to 
business?” 
 
JP:  We didn’t have, we had a lot of staff interaction, and there were some occasions with 
Senator Mitchell specifically, but I would say, I haven’t really tried to kind of figure it out 
exactly, but I would say it was predominantly staff.  We would do things, not necessarily as like 
one hundred percent complete staff, but groups, occasional, add somebody here or there, but we 
would get together at people’s houses.  I remember, one party I remember exactly was at 
Regina’s house, right, what was it, it’s on the House side, she had a townhouse she rented I think 
with somebody, it was like E, D or E [Street] or something, right in the, there’s a Mexican 
restaurant right there at the street they’ve blocked off, it was just up from there.  But everybody 
was there, and Senator Mitchell came.  I don’t think he, he didn’t spend hours there, he was 
probably there for an hour and, you know.   
 
But he worked very much, he was working members if there was a staff specific party, he would 
be there, but mostly briefly.  And, but we would do things, we went to Schooner Fair concerts, 
Schooner Fair remember, you could Google them, Schooner Fair, a folk group from Maine, 
based in Portland.  Well, actually I think they’re actually outside of Bangor, but they were very 
big at the time, and they would come down and do concerts here, like at the Birchmere [Music 
Hall] or other venues, and so we would do that.  Often, Mary McAleney would sort of organize 
and sponsor those.  Have you talked to Mary?  Got to talk to Mary.  But – and Martha Pope. 
 
BW:  Yeah, she’s on the list. 
 
JP:  Yeah.  Was another, you know, people would pull groups together and we would do 
stuff. 
 
BW:  What were, what was the change when he moved up to majority leader, in terms of his 
ability to spend time on environmental issues?  You said the staff, his staff grew so enormously, 
while his responsibilities grew enormously, too.  Did you see a lot, was there a lot less 
investment of his time in environmental issues, or did he keep up to speed pretty much with that? 
 
JP:  Well, I would say – anyone who’s majority leader obviously has a full plate, and so 
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compared to the amount of time he could spend on environmental issues before, it was inevitably 
going to get a little reduced, and it probably, I couldn’t quantify it really in any way, but 
obviously he had a lot of other things.   
 
At the same time he was particularly, in those late ‘80s, early ‘90s, he was very active in a 
number of these other issues, including things like Clean Air Act and the Oil Spill Prevention 
Act, and he remained as a member of the Environment Committee, so he was very active in all of 
that process, and very, I think, viewed as a friend of the environment in the majority leader’s job.  
So that if anything, I think from our perspective on the committee staff, having him as majority 
leader meant that the chances of moving environmental legislation or getting issues resolved 





JP: But I mean the whole, it would probably be worth some time, on the whole subject of the 
Clean Air Act reauthorization and, I don’t know if you’ve got Kate Kimball on your list, but you 
would surely get some great insights from her about particularly this period, and she was doing, 
you know, all the staffing for the reauthorization of the Air Act for him. 
 
BW:  Am I right that there were attempts to do Clean Water reauthorizations too, in the early 
‘90s? 
 
JP:  Oh yeah. 
 
BW:  Do you want to briefly -? 
 
JP:  Sure.  Well that was a long and painful process, ultimately unsuccessful.  After the 
reauthorization in ’87 there was an implementation period, and the authorizations for the new 
revolving funds I think went through ‘91, so in like, or two, ‘92.  In the early ‘90s, from the 
committee staff point of view, we wanted to begin to move forward with a reauthorization 
process.  Senator Baucus was the ranking member of the subcommittee at that point, I think 
Senator Baucus, and Senator Burdick had become chairman.  Bentsen had moved to Finance, 
Senator Moynihan had become chair for a short time, and then Senator Burdick again, or then 
Senator Burdick, and so my hope was to begin to sort of organize, as the person on the 
committee most working on water issues, was to begin to organize a reauthorization process.   
 
We developed a bill S.1081, which was I think intended to take the ‘87 amendments a step 
further in a lot of important respects, and we moved quite well on that bill.  We didn’t have a lot 
of administration support, unfortunately, and I think ultimately that bill got out of committee but 
not to the Senate floor, in the end.  And the process began again in the next Congress.  This time 
Senator Graham was chairman of the subcommittee, and again we made a lot of progress with a 
bill, and ultimately, after a lot of hearings, some markup, committee reported the bill but again 
we weren’t able to get it enac-, passed in the Senate.  
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Those bills would have both extended the sewage treatment program, but they would have added 
a number of other strengthening amendments to the act that, I think we were in the position of 
trying to move legislation where we had lots of good individual small ideas, but no great 
overarching big idea, and because the act could have, in effect, continue, there was nothing, 
nothing was going to expire, and even the authorizations were not technically needed in order for 
appropriations to continue.  There needed to be sort of an overriding reason to reauthorize the 
act, and while we had lots of good things that we could do to individual pieces, and lots of 
strengthening amendments that we could do, ultimately it didn’t prove possible to get a strong 
enough case to move legislation.  And partly that was because there were, it was hard to 
coordinate with the House, the House bills were moving but they weren’t all moving at the same 
time.  And in fact, even since then, there has been no reauthorization of the Clean Water Act at 
anything like the comprehensive scale of the ‘87 amendments. 
 
BW:  What prompted you then to go back to EPA in ‘95, was that change in majority, I guess? 
 
JP:  Well, there was that, but it was more importantly Senator Mitchell’s decision to retire.  
And I don’t, he decided to retire obviously long before he knew that the Senate wouldn’t be in 
Democratic hands in the next Congress, but at that time I had been working for the committee for 
eight years, most of that time I had been working for, pretty directly for Senator Mitchell, but 
trying to do a little bit of work, substantive work with the members in, who were assigned to the 
issue areas I was assigned to, particularly Clean Water and Drinking Water.  And that’s always a 
little bit of a difficult balance because my first loyalty was to Senator Mitchell, and yet I was 
being paid by the committee, and committee, other committee members, including the chairman 
and the ranking, or the full committee and subcommittee chairmen were expecting committee 
work out of me, so I was really trying to kind of keep both of those things going.   
 
And as Senator Baucus became chair, rose to be chair of the committee, I think he was looking 
for, and his staff were looking for, well, shall we say a tighter-knit group of staff people on the 
committee focused on Senator Baucus, which is a very reasonable idea.  And I think Senator 
Baucus and Senator Mitchell always worked fine together, got along fine together.  At the same 
time, I think Senator Baucus wanted to have the committee be as much his committee, and so as 
the Senate went into Republican hands, obviously the staff author-, the staff funding authority 
switched to predominantly for the Republican staff and less money for the Democratic staff.  So 
as someone who was not really a core Baucus person, had always been effectively a Mitchell 
person, I was kind of on the short end of the, this changeover.   
 
And frankly, while I guess I could have pushed back on that and sort of tried to, with Mitchell 
gone, tried to kind of acclimate myself to a different set of parties and loyalties, I think I really 
just decided that I didn’t want to do that, that I’d had a great time working under the 
circumstances I had been working, that ten years on the Hill was probably a good, solid 
experience, and that to try and change my skin, so to speak, and fit into a different office with a 
whole different group, and the experience with the Mitchell organization at that time, it had 
grown to be the Mitchell, the far-flung Mitchell enterprise had been so good that it was like, 
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‘Well, it’ll never be the same,’ going from working for majority leader to working for the 
chairman of the committee, never quite the same.  And frankly, I think there was probably a little 
bit of a feeling on the Baucus side, not the senator so much himself but just in his staff, that me 
personally, and maybe this kind of was by implication with Senator Mitchell, were a little more 
on the green enviro side. 
 
It was a few years there where Senator Baucus, you know, was kind of touch and go to get 
reelected in Montana as an environmental Democrat, and he had to be very careful about not 
appearing to be too sort of lost – losing track of his western roots.  And so I think there was a 
feeling like, well, people looked at the Mitchell people, or me, as someone who was maybe 
further to the environmental side of the policies that maybe Baucus wouldn’t really want to be 
highlighting and that were in his interest to highlight as a senator who needed to get reelected, 
not just in the West, but in Montana.   
 
I think on both sides there was a feeling like, “Well maybe this is just a good time to be gone and 
do something different.”  And the opportunity to work for the new guy who was the assistant 
administrator for Water at EPA came up, and it seemed like that was a chance to keep doing a lot 
of the water stuff that I had been doing, to be outside of that sort of Hill environment for a while, 
and all in all it seemed like the best thing at the time.  And looking back on it, I think it probably 
was the best thing.   
 
BW:  A lot of people have emphasized how the environmental issues were passed on sort of 
from Ed Muskie to George Mitchell; I mean there was a real continuity there.  What about since 
Mitchell?  Has Olympia Snowe and Cohen and Collins kept on that tradition, or did it sort of 
evaporate when Senator Mitchell left? 
 
JP:  Well, I really think that all the members from Maine are good environmentalists at heart.  
I think the state’s obviously got strong environmental interests.  And at the same time, if you’re 
not on a committee that gives you sort of a platform for advancing legislation and for being a 
recognized expert in a particular area, it’s really hard to have that kind of national reputation.   
 
Senator Muskie had, obviously, a lot of other interests, but he was, I think, absolutely recognized 
as an environmental leader, and I think it would have been hard for him to have done that 
without being on the committee.  And I don’t, I didn’t mention earlier, but I had one brief 
experience in which, as a senior at Bowdoin, I had a year, or actually a semester studying in 
Washington, and it was a program run out of American University, you took some classes about 
U.S. government and then you, you had, at the same time you had an internship for the full time 
you were here.  And my internship was with the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental 
Relations, which was chaired by Senator Muskie.  It was in the old Carroll Arms Hotel, which 
had been converted into Senate offices, since torn down.   
 
So it was just down the street from the Russell office where Muskie was at the time, so I had a 
little experience working for a subcommittee staff that was working for Muskie.  I wasn’t in his 
personal office, but I did a few things, I wrote a statement for him that he gave on the Senate 
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floor about oil embargos, vaguely I remember that.  And I would tag along with him to a couple 
of hearings.  Usually I was just getting his coffee and stuff like that, which was great.  And I, so I 
remember being in this, the offices that became Mitchell’s office, just a little bit.   
 
And I always thought there was absolutely a transition between Muskie’s work and the kinds of 
things that Senator Mitchell had emphasized, partly I think because Senator Mitchell worked for 
Senator Muskie, and also because it just was smart to keep working on some of those same 
things.  And if for some reason Senator Mitchell had not become appointed as a member of the 
Environment Committee, he wouldn’t have been able to do anything like that.  And I think 
Muskie and Mitchell probably talked about, “Well what committees should you be on?”  And I 
suspect that while Mitchell was on whatever committees he was on, Finance and what have you, 
I think there was probably some interest in having him, and he probably had the interest in 
maintaining the continuity on the Environment Committee because it is the platform on which 
you can advance legislation.   
 
And ultimately, I think, it paid him good dividends.  He’s probably better recognized now in the 
environmental world for his work on the Clean Air Act than he is for his work on Water, and 
that’s probably fair in the bigger picture.  Although I think a lot of the stuff that he did on Water 
is probably not as well understood or recognized as it should be. 
 
BW:  Well this is one place where we can correct that. 
 
JP:  Well I think it was really just a whole array of things, not just the Clean Water Act 
reauthorization, which at the time I think he did get a lot of good credit for, with Chafee, 
collectively.  But as the whole Clean Air Act debate evolved and the acid rain and the other air 
issues evolved, I think that is more fresh and had a bigger, and because of his majority leader 
thing, he had a more, people perceived him having a more tangible hold on that.  And that’s 
probably right.   
 
But over the years he kept up a strong interest in all these other things that came up as issues.  He 
had lots of legislation, most of which I wrote for him to introduce, but he did a great job of still 
maintaining that interest, the Coastal Protection legislation, the Marine Research legislation, 
particularly focused on the Gulf of Maine, and on other things.  I mean he was very supportive of 
the initial work that we did on radon gas and the legislation that we ultimately got enacted on 
that.   
 
And I had looked at the radon gas issue – this is maybe a good example of Mitchell being willing 
to look at a complicated issue that wasn’t maybe the popular topic of the day in the 
environmental community, because when you looked at radon gas it was pretty clear that as big a 
threat as that was, it was really just part of suite of other problems related to indoor air pollutants.  
And I developed some ideas about that, put them into a legislative framework, and he was 
willing and very supportive of advancing that legislation, introducing it, advancing it, as best he 
could, for I think it was three different Congresses over a six-year period.  And we never did get 
it enacted.  I think we raised the visibility of the issue a lot, and we got a lot of good testimony 
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and built a lot of awareness.  The bill itself, though, as kind of a legislative accomplishment, 
never did finally get done.  And there still isn’t a statutory foundation for dealing with indoor air 
pollution, but EPA now does a lot more work in indoor air pollution, I think there’s a better 
understanding of the issue. 
 
There were other legislative things, too, during that period, where a bill introduced by Senator 
Mitchell would, maybe not ultimately be enacted, but in some cases be included in a different 
bill that was finally enacted.  Or there are cases where, just by introducing a bill, you have the 
effect of helping to frame the debate, and without that particular thing the debate would have 
gone in a different direction because it wouldn’t have been shaped by that idea.   
 
We had, for instance, a very difficult problem in Maine with combined sewer overflows, which 
had never really been tackled, completely solved as part of the ‘87 amendments.  Cities like 
Portland, South Portland had combined sewer overflows – basically that means where part of the 
city had sewers that carried both sewage as well as storm water, so that in a heavy rainfall event 
all the water would run into the sewers and the amount of flow going to the treatment plant was 
more than the treatment plant could handle, and so they had to divert the high flow into the bay, 
carrying raw or very limited treated sewage.  And those overflows were causing beach closings, 
they were causing health problems, and so, and there were eight hundred or so communities 
around the country that still had these, in effect, antiquated sewer systems, or inadequate 
treatment. 
 
And there was a long debate about, “Well, should we just allow them, or should we completely 
control them?  Or-?”  It kind of came down to how big of a storm event do you really want to try 
and manage?  And so as a result of some hearings and some legislation we put together and 
working with people in Maine, we came up with a proposal that was a pretty strong proposal for 
dealing with these, and bringing down the number of overflows to a certain rain event, as 
described hydrologically.  And that bill, although it never got enacted, was viewed by the eight 
hundred communities who had these problems as sort of, I shouldn’t really call it a threat, but as 
much as a demonstration of what strong support in Congress might ultimately result in enacting.   
 
And by having it out there, the environmental community and the EPA and the municipalities 
ultimately agreed to a cooperative kind of process in which they hammered out a solution that 
they all ended up in a sense supporting as a consensus, a CSO policy, that was never, that was 
signed by those parties, it was never enacted by Congress, and in fact I think Senator Mitchell’s 
bill probably couldn’t have been enacted but it was out there as, “Well if we don’t get together 
and work something out, Congress is going to do it to us, and we don’t want that.  And this bill 
that Senator Mitchell’s introduced is evidence that if we were to let Congress just do it 
themselves, we might not be as happy with the solution as if we did it ourselves.”   
 
I think Senator Mitchell, by taking that position, he didn’t, he wasn’t saying, “This is the bill that 
should, without any single changes, be passed.”  He was saying, “This would be a strong bill.  
Let’s go through the legislative process and work something out.”  And while that wasn’t 
possible, it, just by having the bill, it did spur the affected community to go and work out a 
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solution that wasn’t maybe as good as the bill, exactly as he had introduced it.  It was probably 
as good as what would have ultimately been the product of the legislative process had it played 
out in the legislative context.  And I think had he not done the bill, that consensus that there 
wouldn’t have been the impetus for the group in the first place, and the consensus.  There was a 
lot of good work that all those people did to build a consensus outside of the legislative context.  
But I think that’s an example of where just the power to introduce a bill and to be perceived as 
having the opportunity to advance it, created a different outcome than would have occurred. 
 
BW:  Did you have a kind of final meeting with Senator Mitchell when your association with 
him was coming to an end, any one-on-one, or were you party to the time when he announced he 
was leaving, were you in the room at that time? 
 
JP:  Yeah, yeah, I remember we all went over to, there was a room in the Capitol, I don’t 
remember exactly where it was.  We didn’t know, I didn’t know what the announcement was.  
We just got a call, “Come over to…” and they had these funny chairs, I don’t know, they were 
these, I can’t remember exactly but I have this image of them as being gilded chairs or 
something, and sort of lined up.  And so we just kind of filed in and when we were all sitting, 
kind of waiting, Senator Mitchell came out and gave a nice talk, explained he was retiring, and 
that kind of thing.  We were all pretty stunned I think, frankly.  Here he was absolutely sort of in 
a very important, powerful position in the Senate, and really in all appearances absolutely on top 
of his game, so to speak.   
 
And I don’t think it ever really occurred, it never occurred to me that he wouldn’t be there for a 
long time.  But I think he made a good case.  I don’t remember a lot of it actually, at this point, 
but I have one recollection that I, for whatever reason, I was sitting in the last row of one of 
these, in one of these chairs, and maybe we all still had kind of stunned expressions on our face 
when he finished talking and he was getting ready to leave.  And he was, for whatever reason, he 
was walking by, or he stopped to answer a question or something, and he put his arm on my 
shoulder; I was, I guess I was sitting and he just set his arm on my shoulder.  And I, he would, 
not something he would usually do, or ever, and I think it was sort of a little gesture of 
conciliation or something to, he’d known he’d delivered hard news, because all of us, we were 
all, we all understood that this was changing everything and the way we had been working and 
plans and sort of our perceptions of our own futures.   
 
And for all the right reasons that he did it, I think he at that point, whether he had, walking in the 
door, he hadn’t really kind of perceived how, the impression it would make on this group of 
people, or whether it kind of came clear to him as he was saying it.  But I think I just felt at the 
time that he was trying to kind of, just offer some kind of statement about how important sort of 
the collective group of us were to him.  It certainly made me feel a little better about the whole 
idea of, ‘All of this changing,’ and having to sort of find a new thing to go on to from there on 
out.  There was still plenty of time at that point, he announced – maybe you have it there.  We 
had months and months still, ‘til the actual - 
 
BW:  But if he’d stayed on, you would have stayed on. 
  
Page 27 of  28 
 
JP:  Oh sure, yeah, absolutely.   
 
BW:  Well we’ve covered a lot of territory.  Is there anything else you’d like to put on this oral 
history? 
 
JP:  Well, I’m sure as people look back on that whole experience, or if some day somebody 
scholarly wants to try and figure out more about how all that went, I’m sure they’ll only do it 
with an interest in, sort of a biographical interest in Senator Mitchell.  It’s always seemed to me 
that there were a couple of really interesting things about that time and about Senator Mitchell.  
There is of course all the great stuff he did and sort of the substance, but what always seems 
more interesting to me is to sort of figure out what it was that really was the reason for the 
dramatic, sort of spectacular ascendancy, if you will; somebody who was initially appointed to 
the Senate, not a career politician in that sense.   
 
I mean he was coming out of a judgeship, had been a lawyer, had political experience obviously, 
and had, with Muskie and in the Democratic Party of Maine, but was not a practicing politician, 
if you will, at the time.  And had gotten himself reelected, and then got himself involved as, on 
the Campaign, Senate Democratic Campaign Committee as chair, and then became, was able to 
win the majority leader’s battle, which is a whole ‘nother story, something Martha could tell you 
a lot about, and Rich.  But, and then to be a very successful majority leader, someone who all of 
his colleagues, and I look back, and taking nothing away from Tom Daschle or Harry Reid, I 
don’t perceive that they run the Senate in the, with the same confidence and skill that Senator 
Mitchell did, or that the Senate has the influence in the broader policy world with the 
bureaucracy, et cetera, that it did then. 
 
So one question is:  how was he able to do this in such a short period of time?  And then the 
second question is:  and then why he left, and what was it that was the turning point for his 
decision that it was important that he leave, either to himself or to the people around him, 
including the extended staff?  And in a larger sense, to make kind of, to take a position that 
someone, even someone as effective as he obviously was, to be holding power in an important 
governmental position, very high governmental position, for an indefinite period of time, is that a 
good idea in the way American democracy works?  And how long was he majority leader, eight 
years?  That was, he could have - 
 
BW:  Six years. 
 
JP:  Six years, yeah, he could have been majority leader probably for another ten or fifteen; 
he could be majority leader today, probably.  And I think he looked at that and said, “That’s a 
path, and, but there are other paths.”  And for understanding, I thought about it, why would he do 
it?  There must have been lots of reasons, and what they were would be interesting for a 
biographer to try and understand.  And I think people’s perspective from this oral history 
probably would be a good resource, but really the best resource would be Senator Mitchell 
himself.  But there were people obviously a lot closer to him than I was at that point, and there 
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were personal matters.   
 
There was, I think, the notion about, I never heard him say it, but I do think that he had a, kind of 
a, I maybe blame Bowdoin College, but I think he had a liberal arts kind of outlook on, and a 
lawyer’s outlook on politics and the legal system and probably read Cicero and had an 
appreciation, still does, of, people become entrenched in positions, and over a long period of 
time, have a lot of power in a position like that, and lots of historical reasons to think that it’s not 
good for a person, it’s not good for the institution they’re trying to serve, and that there are 
reasons why you need fresh faces and fresh blood, and you’ve got to roll it over.   
 
And yet, for all those reasons, it still came as a shock when he said, “Well, I’m retiring.”  And so 
that wasn’t something a lot of other people thought about.  So I think those are the, amidst all the 
things that were accomplished, and there were a lot of them, and all the great skills and abilities 
that he had and demonstrated and used in order to make all that happen, understanding why he 
would have accomplished the ascendancy so expertly, with all the skills that were needed to get 
there, and to have used the skills for that defined period of time, and then moved on.  Now he’s 
moved on to obviously great things, and I’m sure you’ve got them all there, but from the 
perspective of a staff person, one of many staff people at the time, it was a hard, it was sort of a 
hard question to get your -   “Why would he do that?” 
 
BW:  Right, right.  Thank you. 
 
JP:  It’s a pleasure. 
 
End of Interview 
